This paper assesses the effect on total factor productivity (TFP) of a change in the status of a firm from domestic producer to either exporter or subsidiary of a multinational firm. It is an extension of earlier work that looks solely on the effect of exporting on TFP (Girma et al, 2003 and Wagner, 2002 . In particular, it estimates the differences in TFP between domestic, exporting firms or subsidiaries of multinationals after controlling for the likely presence of endogeneity using the Multiple Treatment Approach Costa Dias, 2000 and Lechner, 2001) . Results show that firms that have become exporters experience higher TFP, between 7.8% and 8.8%, with respect to domestic producers. Productivity gains were also experienced for firms acquired by multinationals relative to domestic producers ranging from 11.5% to 13%. Finally, exporters have a lower annual TFP compared to firms acquired by multinationals by around 10 percentage points.
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Non-Technical Summary
Increasing international trade and the emergence of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) are two of the most significant phenomena the UK economy has experienced the last twenty years. These changes have affected the UK economy in various ways. This paper focuses on the question whether the decision of a British firm to become an exporter or the acquisition of a British firm by a multinational company affects its productivity. Following on the recent theoretical literature on exports versus FDI and productivity and the empirical research on the causal effect of exporting on productivity, I try to assess the causal effect of exporting decision or acquisition by MNEs on the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth of British firms. For that reason, I extend the single treatment approach followed by Girma etal (2003 Girma etal ( , 2004 and Wagner (2002) , allowing for an additional treatment. This additional treatment is the possible outcome that a local firm is acquired by a multinational.
The dataset used includes information on an unbalanced panel of more than 14,113 British firms in the manufacturing sector for the period from 1990 to 1996. Firms are divided into three types: pure domestic (non-exporters), exporters and firms acquired by domestic and foreign multinationals. There are between 2,441 and 3,137 firms each year and all of them are observed at least for two consecutive years.
Introduction
During the last two decades UK has become one of the most globally integrated economies in the world. There are many aspects of this phenomenon in the UK economy, but two can be considered as the most important. The …rst is the rapid expansion of UK's international trade with other countries 1 . While the second is the growing activities and importance of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) within UK and in particular the increase of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI ) 2 . The e¤ects of increased trade and FDI have raised numerous discussions among the public and the academic community with regard to the bene…ts and losses for national economies. In this paper the discussion will focus on the UK economy and the question whether the decision of a British …rm to become an exporter or the acquisition of a British …rm by a multinational company a¤ects its productivity.
There is already a vast literature that tries to assess the exporting decision versus productivity question, see for example Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998), Bernard and Jensen (1999) and Girma, Greenaway and Kneller (2004) . The main question that is addressed in this body of literature is whether the decision of a …rm to export leads to better performance. In particular there are two main hypotheses under investigation: i) the learning by exporting (LBE) hypothesis and ii) the self selection hypothesis. The …rst suggests that when a …rm enters the export market becomes more productive due to higher competition and by accumulating knowledge from a potentially more advanced market. While, the second claims that future exporters experience an increase in their productivity some time before exporting takes place, since they have to be able to cover sunk costs in order to enter the foreign market.
From an econometric point of view, it is clear that there is a problem of causality. Do exporters become more productive or is it that more productive …rms enter foreign markets? Many di¤erent approaches have been implemented in order to tackle the causality problem and di¤erent results were obtained. For example, Clerides etal (1998) used full information maximum likelihood and generalised method of moments estimators on a panel of Colombian, Mexican and Moroccan …rms and found that there is no learning by exporting 3 and that exporters self select. Similar results were obtained by Bernard and Jensen (1999) on a much larger unbalanced panel of US plants, but without looking for causal e¤ects. On the other hand, Girma etal (2004) implemented a di¤erence in di¤erence approach in an unbalanced panel of matched UK …rms and found that both self selection 1 2.64% annual increase for total trade in constant prices for the period 1960-2003 (OECD, Historical International Trade by Commodities, 1961 Commodities, -1990 Commodities, , 1991 Commodities, -2003 2 $28 billion of inward FDI in ‡ow on average per year over the period 1981-2004 (OECD, International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook, 2005) . 3 with the exception of Morocan …rms.
1 and learning by exporting exist. Similar to the literature on the decision to export and productivity, the research on the topic of the theory of FDI is voluminous and dates back at least three decades 4 .
One of the …rst attempts was by Dunning (1977 Dunning ( , 1981 5 , who stated that a multinational …rm should be superior to local …rms in order to enter the domestic market due to costs of entry. Dunning speci…ed this superiority in three advantages a multinational should posses in order to be able to undertake FDI. These are: i) an ownership advantage, ii) a location advantage and iii) an internalisation advantage. The ownership advantage refers to exclusive product or production practices like patents or R&D. The location advantage is related to trade restrictions, such as tari¤s and quotas, transportation cost and lower labour cost at the host country. The internalisation advantage refers to the fact that …rm speci…c practices and technologies are better transferred within the same company rather than by licensing 6 . Hence, the ability of the MNE to transfer its advanced technology to its subsidiary could lead to better performance in terms of total factor productivity for the newly acquired …rm.
Recently, a new stream of the literature has tried to integrate the two existing theoretical frameworks discussed above by formulating a model where a …rm can choose the mode of entry in a foreign market, either by exporting or undertaking FDI and the importance of …rm productivity di¤erences. Helpman etal (2004) construct a model in which …rms can serve a market abroad by exporting or horizontal FDI, similar to the proximityconcentration literature (see Krugman, 1983 , Horstmann and Markusen, 1992 , Brainard, 1993 , and Markusen and Venables, 2000 , that allows for …rm heterogeneity in productivity. Firms choose to undertake FDI, if trade costs are higher than the cost of acquiring or building and maintaining a plant abroad. Helpman etal show that there is a clear partition of …rms with respect to their productivity and the mode of serving a foreign market. The most productive …rms will engage into FDI, while the next most productive …rms will export and the least productive …rms will just sell in the domestic market. This result seems to be consistent with empirical evidence in the case of UK (Girma etal, 2005) and for the case of Japan (Head and Ries, 2003) .
In this paper, following on the recent theoretical literature on exports versus FDI and productivity and the empirical research on the causal e¤ect of exporting on productivity, I try to assess the causal e¤ect of exporting decision or acquisition by MNEs on the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth of British …rms for the period 1990-1996. For that reason, I extend the single treatment approach followed by Girma etal (2004) and Wagner (2002) , allowing for an additional treatment. This additional treatment is the possible outcome that a local …rm is acquired by a multinational. More speci…cally, using a multiple treatments approach based on the literature on evaluation methods, Blundel and Costa Dias (2000), Frolich (2002), Lechner (2001) and (2002) and Heckman and Navarro-Lozano (2003), I will try to assess the following causal e¤ects on TFP for British …rms for the period 1990-1996 : i) becoming an exporter relative to remaining a domestic producer, ii) being acquired by an MNE relative to remaining domestic producer and iii) becoming an exporter relative to being acquired by an MNE.
I …nd that British exporters are more productive than British …rms selling only domestically. Exporters appear to be more productive relative to domestic producers by 7.79% to 8.79% one year after they became exporters. This …nding is similar with the results obtained in other studies, see for example Girma etal (2004) for the UK, Alvarez and Lopez (2005) for Chile and Wagner (2002) for Germany. I also …nd that British …rms acquired by MNEs experience higher TFP growth one year after acquisition than domestic sellers. They gain between eleven to thirteen percentage points more TFP when compared with domestic producers. This result is similar in terms of sign and magnitude as the one obtained in Conyon et al (2002) with the solely di¤erence that they look on labour productivity for British …rms. Girma and Gorg (2007) also found a positive causal e¤ect, but very small in magnitude in their work for two sectors in British manufacturing. While Harris and Robinson (2002) found that British subsidiaries experience lower TFP growth relative to domestic producers a year after acquisition. Finally, there is evidence that British exporters are less productive when compared to British …rms acquired by MNEs. New British exporters have a smaller productivity growth of 8.6 to 9.95 percent one year after they begin to export. This result seems to be in agreement with the argument of Dunning (1977) that MNEs have a superior technology and are able to transfer it to their subsidiaries.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 I brie ‡y discuss a simple theoretical framework as a way to motivate the empirical question. Sections 3 and 4 describe econometric issues that arise because of the simultaneity problem and the three causal e¤ects that can be estimated. The control for confounding approach that is used and the necessary conditions in order to identify the counterfactual are discussed in Section 5. While Section 6 describes the advantages of pair-matching on the propensity score estimator that is implemented to get the causal e¤ect for the following three cases; a) exporting vs domestic production, b) exporting vs becoming subsidiary of MNEs and c) being acquired by MNEs vs domestic producers. In addition, it discusses the extensions of the propensity score matching estimator that permit for bias correction when not exact matching is present and allow heteroscedastic variances for treatments. Section 7 o¤ers a detailed description of the original data and the steps followed to construct the …nal sample. In Section 8, I present and discuss the results for the Multinomial Logit and the three Average Treatment E¤ect for the Treated estimates obtained when the condition of Common Support is imposed and for the whole sample, respectively. Furthermore, the validity of the Irrelevant Independence Alternatives assumption and the Common Support condition are tested and discussed. Finally, Section 9 o¤ers a detailed conclusion of the results and discuss their implications.
Theoretical Background
A theoretical framework similar to the type of proximity-concentration trade-o¤ model is needed in order to describe the setup of my research question. In particular, I assume that …rms operate within a dynamic monopolistic competition environment, are initially producing and selling only into the domestic market and then have the possibility to choose between three di¤erent alternative states. They can decide to: i) remain domestic producers, ii) become exporters or iii) become subsidiaries of MNEs. The di¤erence of this setup with other theoretical models, like Helpman etal (2004) , lays on the fact that I look at the case where a …rm is the recipient of FDI rather than being the investor. As in all similar models there are bene…ts and costs related to the three decisions of the …rm. A pro…t maximising …rm will choose one of the three alternatives, only if its current and future discounted revenues from such a choice are higher than the cost.
First, consider the decision of a …rm to export compared to a situation where it sells only at home. The cost of such a decision consists mainly of trade restrictions (tari¤s), transportation cost and sunk costs of exporting (product alteration). While the revenues arise from increased sales or the presence of economies of scale. Hence, a …rm will decide to export if the expected discounted gains from exporting are greater than the cost of entry into the foreign market, as in the model of Roberts and Tybout (1997) .
Second, a …rm faces the choice to accept the o¤er of a MNE to become its subsidiary relative to remaining a domestic producer. The gains associated with such a decision are mainly …nancial and more speci…cally the amount o¤ered by the MNE for the acquisition. While the cost is the loss of ownership and is related to the market value of …rm plus the present value of any future revenues. In addition assume that the domestic …rm faces uncertainty in the market that operates, which a¤ects its future pro…ts. Hence, the local …rm will choose to become a subsidiary of a multinational if the monetary reward is higher than its present market value and future pro…ts (adjusted for uncertainty) 7 . Similarly, the decision of the domestic …rm between exporting and being a subsidiary of a MNE will depend on the net gains from exporting compared to the net gains of becoming a¢ liated to a multinational. If the former is higher than the latter then the …rm decides to export and vice versa.
In an environment like this, an increase in the …xed cost of exporting will lead to a situation in which there are less exporters and more of domestic producers and …rms acquired by MNEs. While a fall in uncertainty will result in less companies to be acquired by MNEs and more companies exporting and selling domestically. This is a rather simple theoretical background, it is de…nitely not a model and its main purpose is to motivate the empirical question and discussion.
Econometric Issues
The research question of this paper tries to assess the e¤ect of a change in the status of British …rms on their total factor productivity growth. In particular, the focus lays on the estimation of the causal di¤erences on the TFP growth for a British …rm that is producing only for the domestic market and is becoming either an exporter or is acquired by a multinational company. As it was discussed earlier, the direction of causality between the decision of a …rm to change status and its observed productivity is not clear. More speci…cally there is a simultaneity problem. Exporters might increase their productivity because they learn from the new market (learning by exporting), but equally exporters might need to experience an increase to their productivity before exporting to the foreign market in order to cover the …xed cost of entry. Similar arguments apply for the case of the acquisition of domestic …rms by MNEs. A British …rm that becomes the subsidiary of a MNE could gain in terms of productivity through the superior technology and management of the multinational. While, MNEs might target highly productive British …rms for acquisition (cherry picking).
The estimation technique that is followed, multiple treatment matching, in this paper is trying to address this simultaneity problem embedded on the research question. A simple comparison of the productivities between …rms that chose di¤erent alternatives, for example an exporter versus a domestic producer, will su¤er from estimation bias. The reason is that …rms that chose a particular status might have certain characteristics that would have allowed them to experience an increase in TFP, even without a change in their status. The simultaneity problem would have ceased to exist if there was available information about the potential TFP of those that chose a particular status had they chosen another. For example, the TFP growth that an exporting …rm would have experienced had it decided to remain a domestic producer. This is a counterfactual and it is not possible to be observed. But with the use of matching techniques and some assumptions it is possible to identify these causal e¤ects.
There are studies of Girma etal (2003) and (2004) and Wagner (2002) that estimate the di¤erences in TFP growth for exporters and non-exporters in UK and Germany, respectively. Both studies control for the possible endogeneity problem of selection for exporters using matching techniques. Here, I am extending this approach, allowing for an extra "treatment", the possibility that a …rm is acquired by a multinational …rm. Hence, I follow a multiple treatments approach based on the recent literature on evaluation methods, Blundel and Costa Dias (2000) for example.
The Problem of Identi…cation and the Three Causal E¤ects
Counterfactual and the Stable Unit Treatment Assumption
In the current setup a treatment is de…ned as the status that a …rm has been through from time t to time t + 1. Hence, there are three possible treatments. Either becoming an exporter or being acquired by a MNE or remaining a domestic producer. Let i = 1; :::; n indicate a …rm, let j = DP; EX; AM denotes a treatment, where DP indicates a domestic producer, EX an exporter and AM indicates a subsidiary of a multinational. I assume that a …rm is a domestic producer, if it produces and sells its product only in the domestic market. An exporter is de…ned as a …rm that produces and sells domestically, but some of its output is also exported. Both domestic producers and exporters are owned by British …rms that are not engaged in multinational activities. While a subsidiary of a MNE produces and sells for the domestic market, but it is owned by a multinational …rm.
The treatments should be mutually exhaustive and exclusive. Each …rm can have just one of the three statuses at one point in time. This restricts the sample, because we should drop all …rms that are subsidiaries of multinationals and exporters at the same time. In addition, only …rms that were domestic producers before treatment are considered 8 . . The …rst, Y DP it , is the outcome that will be observed had the ith …rm remained a domestic producer at time t, the second, Y EX it , is the outcome that will be observed if …rm i had become an exporter at t and …nally the last one, Y
AM it
, is the outcome that will be observed if …rm i had been acquired by a multinational company.
Before participating in any treatment, at time t 1, all these potential outcomes are latent and are only observed had the …rm gone through the treatment. After participation, at time t, only one of this three potential outcomes is observed, because the …rm either remained a domestic producer, or became an exporter or was acquired by a multinational. The rest of the potential outcomes are counterfactual and are not observed. But using statistical techniques that require some assumptions will enable us to identify these counterfactual and then estimate the causal e¤ects of treatments.
The …rst such assumption that needs to be satis…ed is the Stable Unit Treatment Value assumption, Rubin (1980) , which states that the potential outcomes of a …rm should not be in ‡uenced by the treatment followed by other …rms. Let it be a ternary indicator of the treatment that …rm i followed at time t it = 8 > < > :
it is equal to zero indicates that …rm i is a domestic producer at time t, when it is equal to one the …rm is an exporter and a value of two for it indicates that the …rm is a subsidiary of a MNE. Let be an n 1 vector that contains each …rm's indicator it . Y denotes the observed outcome vector for all …rms and Y ( ) the potential outcome that will prevail if all …rms had followed their treatment according to their indicator it . Let Y i ( ) be the potential outcome of the ith …rm. Assume that there are two possible treatment allocations for every …rm and 0 respectively. Then, the Stable Unit Treatment Value assumption states that
which means that the observed outcome for the ith …rm depends only on its treatment and not on the treatment followed by other …rms. This is a strong assumption, since it rules out any interaction between …rms, like spillovers and other externalities. In the presence of such interactions, it is possible that the outcome variable might also be a¤ected. For exclude from the analysis …rms that have been either exporters or subsidiaries in the past.
example, if there are spillovers between …rms then the TFP of domestic …rms might change due to a change in the TFP of exporters or …rms that were acquired by multinationals. But the magnitude of these kind of e¤ects will be small as long as the participants in the corresponding treatments are small relative to the population of the …rms. There are studies in the labour market programmes evaluation literature, Blanchard and Diamond (1989) and (1990) for example, that try to estimate the e¤ects in the case that the Stable Unit Treatment Value assumption is not fully satis…ed. But such a task is not easy and generates other di¢ culties for the estimation of the causal e¤ects 9 .
The Three Causal E¤ects and a Naive Estimator
There are three possible e¤ects that can be estimated:
de…ned as the di¤erence between the outcome expected after following treatment k and the outcome expected after following treatment l for a random …rm from the entire population, b) the Average Treatment on the Treated (ATET)
is similar to the previous but with the di¤erence that now the …rm is selected from the subpopulation of the participants in treatment k, and c) the Average Treatment E¤ect on the Non-Treated (ATENT)
which is the di¤erence in the expected outcome between the participants in treatment k and l, for a …rm drawn from the subpopulation of those that participated in treatment l.
The estimate with the most interest is the Average Treatment E¤ect on the Treated, because it provides information about the causal e¤ect on the outcome for those …rms that have gone through a particular treatment had they decided to follow another one, instead. For example, the Average Treatment E¤ect on the Treated for exporters relative to domestic producers, E Y EX Y DP j = EX , tell us what the gain or loss on TFP exporters experienced had they chosen to remain domestic producers. On the other hand, 9 For more details see Frolich (2002).
8 the Average Treatment E¤ect would have provided an estimate of the causal e¤ect of becoming an exporter relative to remaining domestic producer for the whole population of …rms. Hence, the ATE would have included in the estimation and those …rms that remained either domestic producers or were acquired by MNEs. The interest of this paper lays on the causal e¤ect on TFP growth for those …rms that became either exporters or subsidiaries of MNEs and for that reason the ATET is the appropriate causal e¤ect to consider. In order to highlight the presence of bias on the estimation if simultaneity is not taken in consideration, we consider the case of a naive estimator as it is termed in Blundell, Dearden and Sianesi (2004) . This naive estimator involves the di¤erence in expected outcomes between two …rms that have followed treatments k and l respectively:
where the …rst term on the right hand side is the the Average Treatment E¤ect on the Treated (ATET) and the second term is the bias 10 that arises from such a naive estimator. The reason is that the decisions made by …rms to change status are systematic and consequently the sample of …rms that take a decision is not random. Failing to take this into consideration and comparing …rms that took a speci…c decision with those that they took a di¤erent one will result in biased estimates. Hence, by comparing the observed outcomes of exporters and pure domestic …rms is not an unbiased estimator of the causal e¤ect of becoming an exporter, since exporters might self-select themselves into to foreign markets. A …rm that is to become an exporter might have already 11 experienced an improvement in its TFP. If this is not taken into consideration and a naive estimator is calculated then an increase in the TFP of the new exporter might be wrongly attributed to the change of …rm status.
As it was discussed above the correct estimation requires information about the expected outcomes of a …rm had it followed both of the treatments. For example, the causal e¤ect on TFP growth for a …rm that has become an exporter would require information about the TFP of this …rm had it remained a domestic producer, E Y DP j = EX . But after treatment, only one of the potential outcomes is observed and the other is a counterfactual. There are methods that try to identify this counterfactual by imposing some structure and assumptions in the analysis and are discussed in the next section.
Identi…cation Strategies
One way to solve the identi…cation problem of the counterfactual is usually 12 to design and implement a randomised experiment. This would mean that …rms are assigned randomly into the three di¤erent potential treatments. More formally, this would imply that the potential outcomes, Y j , are statistically independent of the treatment . Hence, in a randomised experiment the decision to go through a particular treatment is random and does not a¤ect the potential outcome. A randomised experiment ensures that any di¤erences between …rms that followed different treatments are random and not systematic. Hence, in such a setup the observed outcome for those that participated in treatment k has the same expected value as the potential outcome for those that participated in programme l;
As a consequence, under randomisation the naive estimator is applicable because there is no any selection bias. But randomisation in the context of the choice of the status of a …rm is very di¢ cult if not applicable at all. For this reason this paper focuses on other approaches that have been suggested in order to tackle the problem of identi…cation. The control for confounding variables approach, Rubin (1974) , is one of them and is used here with some modi…cations. The control for confounding variables approach tries to reproduce the structure of a randomised experiment by constructing comparable groups with similar features. Assume there are two …rms with very similar characteristics, then their potential outcomes should be very close. If these two …rms di¤er only on the treatment that they have been through, then any di¤erence in their observed outcomes should be attributed to the di¤erent treatment followed. If it is possible to …nd a lot of pairs similar to this, then the causal e¤ect of treatment k relative to treatment l can be estimated. But for consistent estimation it is necessary that within each pair, …rms have the same or very similar confounding variables X. The confounding variables X are variables that a¤ect the decision to participate in a treatment and also a¤ect the potential outcomes.
The use of the control for confounding variables approach allows the identi…cation of the counterfactual outcome and consequently the estimation of all the three causal e¤ects mentioned. But it requires that the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) for multiple treatments, Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001) , to be satis…ed:
(7) states that conditional on the confouding variables X, the treatment assignment in- 12 Heckman and Smith (1995) discuss the potential bias that may arise in the case of random experiments.
dicator is independent of the potential outcomes Y j , j = DP; EX; M A. This means, that given all the confouding variables X, knowledge of the treatment followed by a …rm does not provide any additional information about its potential outcome. It should be noted as Lechner (2002) points out that the Conditional Independence Assumption is not the minimal assumption that allows identi…cation. The minimal assumption is conditional mean independence, which as Lechner (2002) says, empirically usually implies CIA. The second necessary condition for identi…cation in the case of multiple treatments is the common support requirement. Let S j = fx : P ( = j j X = x) > 0g denote the support of X for the participants in treatment j, where P ( = j j X = x) is the probability of …rm i with characteristics x follows treatment j. The support of X for treatment j, S j , de…nes a subsample where all …rms with characteristics x have a positive probability of following treatment j. The common support condition requires that for the identi…cation
This means that any …rm with characteristics x and positive probability of following treatment k should also belong to the support for the participants in treatment l. In other words, in order to be able to should be the same, so that the probability for any observed …rm with characteristics x is positive and very similar to the probability that any …rm with characteristics x is following any of the treatments, either k or l.
Under the Conditional Independence Assumption and the common support requirement the following is true
which states that conditional on X the observed outcome Y k for the …rms that have followed treatment k has the same expected value as the potential outcome Y k for those that followed treatment l. Consequently, all the three e¤ects can now be identi…ed. In particular, by following the law of iterated expectations the Average Treatment E¤ect can be expressed in the following way:
where f x is the population probability density function of X and both E Y k j X; = k and E Y l j X; = l are identi…ed and can be estimated from the data.
Hence, the Average Treatment E¤ect is the di¤erence of the expected outcomes given X of both treatment groups weighted by the population probability density function of X. The Average Treatment E¤ect on the Treated is written as:
where f (xj =k) is the probability density function of X among the participants in programme k. The …rst part of the left hand side, E Y k j X; = k , is identi…ed and can be estimated directly from the data, while the second part, R E Y l j X; = l f (xj =k) dx, needs to be estimated non-parametrically. The estimation of the second part proceeds by adjusting the expected outcome of participating in treatment l for the distribution of …rm characteristics X for the participants in treatment k. Similarly, the Average Treatment E¤ect on the Non-Treated (ATENT) is:
where f (xj =l) is the probability density function of X among the participants in programme l. The Average Treatment E¤ect on the Non-Treated is the di¤erence on the potential outcomes between treatments k and l averaged over the probability density function of the participants in the the lth treatment.
The Curse of Dimensionality and Propensity Score Matching
The matching estimator for the ATET, E Y k Y l j X; = k , tries to …nd for each …rm that participated in treatment k at least one …rm that participated in treatment l with identical or very similar confouding variables X. If many pairs like this can be found then the causal e¤ect on Y of following treatment k relative to l is obtained by averaging the di¤erence between the observed outcomes of the matched pairs. Hence, the matching estimator needs to condition on a usually high dimensional vector of X. This creates computational di¢ culties because the estimation of R E Y l j X; = l f (xj =k) dx is nonparametric and results on the so called curse of dimensionality. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) have shown that conditioning instead on a scalar function of X, the propensity score 13 , is su¢ cient for identi…cation in the case of a single treatment. Furthermore, propensity score matching implies that the subsamples of the treated and non-treated groups should have very similar distributions for variables X (Balancing Property) and as a consequence the quality of "matching" is improved. For multiple treatments Lechner (2001) showed that conditional independence on X implies conditional independence on the propensity score p kjkl (x) and consequently the CIA can be re-written as:
where
is the probability of being a participant of the kth treatment instead of participating on treatment l and p j (x) = P ( = j j X) is the marginal probability of participating in treatment j given characteristics X. (12) states that conditional on the propensity score p kjkl (x) the choice of treatment is independent of the potential outcome Y l . So both (9), (10) and (11) can be estimated but with the di¤erence that in this case we need to average over the distribution of the propensity score p kjkl (x) and not the probability density function of X. For example, in the case of ATET (10) the second part of the left hand side is going to be
The propensity score in the case of a single treatment is de…nied as the probabilty of participating in the treatment.
13
where f (p kjkl j =k) is the density of the probability to participate in treatment k instead of participating in treatment l in the subpopulation of k.
There are several estimators that are suggested and can be summarised in the following generalised matching estimator (GME) for the ATET, as discussed in Frolich (2002):
where n k is the number of participants in treatment k and b l (x) is an estimate of the expected outcome of participating in treatment l for those that actually participated in l, conditional on the propensity score of the …rms that followed treatment k, l (x) = E Y l j p kjkl (x i ) ; = l . GME is implemented by adjusting the estimate of the conditional expectation b l (x) for the distribution of p kjkl (x i ) on the subpopulation k and then averaging b l (x) for the values of p kjkl (x i ).
One of the most frequently used estimator is the pair-matching estimator, Rubin (1974) , and is implemented here with some modi…cations. It advances by …nding, "matching", for every observation in the treated (target) group an observation in the non-treated (control) group with the same or very similar propensity score. Hence, the observations from the control group that are used as "matches" are forced to follow the distribution of the propensity score from the target group as (13) indicates. Pair-matching …nds only one "match", the most similar in terms of propensity score, for every observation in the treated sub-sample. It ignores all other observations in the control group that might have slightly more distant values of propensity score. The only exception occurs, when there are more than one observations in the non-treated sub-sample with propensity scores that are equally distanced from the propensity score of an observation in the treated sub-sample. In this case, the average outcome of these non-treated observations is used for the estimation of the counterfactual.
In the analysis of this paper I use pair-matching with replacement on the propensity score. This implies that each observation from the control group can be used more than once as a "match". For example, when three "matches" are allowed, the same observation from the non-treated group can be used as a "match" for observations in the treated group for a maximum of three times. This results to a higher variance for the estimates, but improves the quality of matches and has been suggested as a way to eliminate any bias that arises from non exact matching 14 .
The problem of bias in the case of not exact matching can also be dealt with the use of bias-corrected matching estimators, see Abadie, Drukker, Herr and Imbens (2004) . These estimators adjust the di¤erence on the outcomes between the "matched" observation and the "match" by including the di¤erence on their propensity score. Another issue regarding the matching estimator is that usually the conditional variance of outcome j for …rm i given its propensity score, var Y j i p kjkl (x i ) , is assumed to be constant across di¤erent propensity scores p kjkl (x i ) and treatments j. Here I implement estimators that take into consideration both potential problems and correct for the possible bias from a "poor" quality matching and also allow the conditional variance of outcome to be heteroscedastic. Furthermore, I check whether the Balancing Property of propensity score matching is satis…ed by performing a formal test proposed by Smith and Todd (2005) . Finally, since the Conditional Independence Assumption does not hold in the sample I follow Lechner (2002) and I carry out matching on a new restricted sample, in which the Conditional Independence Assumption is imposed.
Data Description
The dataset that is used is primarily extracted from the OneSource database 15 for the UK from 1990 to 1996. It is an unbalanced longitudinal set that includes all public and private limited companies that employ more than …fty employees. There are 110,000 companies in total and any of them that were in the process of liquidation or dissolved have been excluded from the sample. Due to the fact that only …rms with …fty or more employees are included in the database, it is very likely that the sample is biased towards larger …rms. But this should not create problems within the context of the analysis that is implemented. Exporters and multinational subsidiaries are generally employing more than …fty employees and matching them with domestic producers of the same size in order to form comparable groups seems to be validated. Additionally, OneSource contains information among other variables on employment, physical capital, output, sales, exports, ownership status and the age of …rms. Although the database provides information of foreign ownership for the latest year, this is not su¢ cient in order to observe the time that a British …rm was acquired by a foreign multinational company. For that reason, our sample was matched to a list of British subsidiaries of foreign multinational companies that it was provided by the O¢ ce of National Statistics. In addition, OneSource does not o¤er any information on whether British …rms are acquired by British MNEs. In order to identify these subsidiaries of domestic MNEs our sample was once again matched with the European Linkages and International Ownership Structure 15 OneSource CD-ROM, "UK companies, vol. 1", October 2000.
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(ELIOS) database 16 .
The analysis concentrates on the manufacturing sector only. Furthermore, any …rms that had an annual employment or output growth higher than 100% are dropped from the sample 17 , on the ground that such observations tend not to be reliable. In order to get the …nal sample I divide the original one into two years subsamples 90-91, 91-92, 92-93, 93-94, 94-95 and 95-96. Within each two years subsample, all …rms that are either exporters or subsidiaries of multinationals at the earlier year are excluded. I do so because I am interested on the causal e¤ect of a …rm's status change on its TFP growth. If a …rm has already gone through "treatment" in the earliest time period that is observed, then it does not provide any useful information for the analysis. For each subsample the same …rms are observed in either year. All …rms are domestic producers in the earliest year of every subsample and in the next year some of them switch (becoming exporters or subsidiaries of MNEs) while others remain domestic producers. The …nal sample is constructed by merging all two years subsamples and amounts to 34,752 observations. It includes information on an unbalanced panel of more than 14,113 British …rms in the manufacturing sector for the period from 1990 to 1996 as Table 1 shows. Firms are divided into three types: pure domestic (non-exporters), exporters and …rms acquired by domestic and foreign multinationals. There are between 2,441 and 3,137 …rms each year and all of them are observed at least for two consecutive years. The earlier partition of the sample into two years overlapping subsamples is the reason why in the …rst and last year there are fewer observations than in other years as Table 1 shows.
From Table 1 it is also evident that the sample is balanced through the years with regard to the volume of new exporters and new subsidiaries of MNEs. The highest number of new exporters is observed in the last year 1996, when 120 British …rms began to export, while the minimum was in the year before with only 94 new exporters. Similarly, 1994 was the year with the most acquisitions of British …rms by MNEs, 75 in total and the year before a minimum of 41 new acquisitions took place. In total, over all the years in the sample there were 624 new exporters and 356 new subsidiaries of MNEs in the British manufacturing.
It is clear from Table 1 that changes in the status of …rms are not happening at the same time. Hence, I treat the timing of a change in status as an "experimental time" t e in order to proceed with matching. Observations are grouped according to two "experimental" periods. The …rst is "experimental" time period zero, t 0 e , in which all …rms are domestic producers and the second is "experimental" time period one, t 1 e , where some …rms have 16 The ELIOS database was constructed by the University of Urbino, Italy. 17 I should greatly acknowledge Dr Surafel Girma for providing me with the sample of the data.
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experienced a change in their status 18 . Table 2 shows that there are 17,376 domestic producers at "experimental" time period zero and in the next "experimental" time period 624 of them became exporters and 356 were acquired by MNEs. It is clear from the above discussion about the construction of the data that all the results refer to short-time causal e¤ects, one year after the change of a …rm's status.
Results
I perform propensity score matching allowing for replacement, bias adjustment and heteroscedastic variances in order to estimate the Average Treatment E¤ect on the Treated for three cases. These are the causal e¤ects on TFP growth for British …rms of: i) becoming exporters in relation to remaining domestic producers, ii) becoming subsidiaries of MNEs compared with remaining domestic producers and iii) beginning to export relative to being acquired by MNEs. This requires knowledge about each …rm's propensity score for all the three cases. Therefore, I estimate a Multinomial Logit model on the entire sample so as to get estimates of the marginal probability for each …rm to be in one of the three statuses conditional on a set of variables X. Let i indicate the status j of the ith …rm
Assuming that the errors are independent and identically distributed across di¤erent statuses with a log Weibull (type I extreme value) distribution, G(u ij ) = exp ( e u ij ). The probability that status j is observed for …rm i given X is:
where x ij includes the logarithm of lagged employment, the logarithm of lagged physical capital and lagged age of the …rm. I use one year lagged values for the X variables in an attempt to capture the sequential nature of a …rm's decision to change status. The log of the odds for the multinomial logit are given in Table 3 . All parameters, with the exception of the two employment coe¢ cients, are statistically signi…cant at the 1% level. There are 30,675 observations in the estimation, because there are missing values for some of the lagged X variables. The assumption about the identical and independent distribution of the errors across statuses implies that the log of the odds for any pair of statuses does not depend on any others. This is referred to as the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption. I test for the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives assumption using the Small-Hsiao speci…cation and I …nd that it is satis…ed by the data as it is shown in Table 4 .
The Small-Hsiao Test for the IIA proceeds as follows: First the entire sample is divided into two random subsamples of the same size. Estimates are obtained from the two subsamples. Then one of the two subsamples is chosen (unrestricted model) and all of its observations associated with a particular status are eliminated. This restricted model is estimated again. Finally, a typical Likelihood Ratio (LR) test is calculated, with the LR statistic of the form 2 [likelihood f unction (restricted) likelihood f unction (unrestricted)] following a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of parameters in the restricted model.
The null hypothesis declares that status j and status h are independent of other statuses. For example, in the …rst row of Table 4 the null hypothesis is that the log of the ratio of the probability that a …rm is an exporter relative to the probability that it is a domestic producer is not a¤ected by the other available statuses. Table 4 shows that this null hypothesis cannot be rejected at very high levels of signi…cance. The IIA assumption cannot be rejected for the other two cases either at the 5% level as it is evident from Table  4 . This implies that a …rm's choice between the two statuses does not depend on the availability of other statuses. Hence, the distinction between domestic producers, exporters and subsidiaries of MNEs in the analysis also seems to be valid econometrically.
The descriptive statistics of marginal probabilities by the status of the …rm are presented in Table 5 . Their mean values and standard deviations are quite similar across …rms with di¤erent status. It is clear from Table 5 that the Common Support requirement is not satis…ed in the case of the ATET of exporting relative to remaining domestic producer. Although the maximum value of the probability Pr ( = 1) for an exporter (5:72) is smaller than the corresponding maximum value for a domestic producer (7:49), the minimum value for exporters (0:70) is smaller than that for domestic producers (0:73). Only in the last case the of ATET of being acquired by a MNE relative to remaining a domestic producer the Common Support condition holds, because as it can be seen from The fact that the Common Support is not satis…ed by the data, suggests that the estimate of ATET might not be accurate. The reason is that failure of the Common Support condition indicates that for some observations in the treated group there are no comparable observations in the control and consequently the counterfactual cannot be identi…ed. A possible solution is to restrict the analysis and perform matching on the subsample of the data, where the Common Support requirement holds. In such a case the ATET, E Y k Y l j X; = k , is rede…ned as the causal e¤ect for only those observations that satisfy the Common Support condition. Following Lechner (2002) , I exclude all observations with probabilities lower than the highest value of the minimum probability across statuses. Analogously, I delete all observations with probabilities greater than the lowest value of the maximum probability between di¤erent statuses. This results to dropping 4,411 observations, 12.69% of the sample. This is a quite large part of the sample, but about 99% of the observations dropped were for domestic producers that are the most populous group in the data. The remaining 29,372 observations of domestic producers in contrast to the 33,772 in the initial sample still seem to be a good representation of the British …rms serving the domestic market. This is also evident from the very similar results produced by propensity score matching on the Common Support and the whole sample as Table 6 and Table 7 present respectively. Equation (13) has been estimated having as outcome variable the annual total factor productivity growth of British …rms in manufacturing. TFP growth has been estimated from a translog production function using Generalised Least Squares 19 . Pair-Matching is performed on the propensity score with replacement, allowing for a maximum of four matches for each observation on the control group. Table 6 also includes estimates that correct for bias estimation arising from not exact matching (bias adj) and also estimates that allow for heteroscedastic variances of statuses (robust). From Table 6 it is evident that the ATET for exporters relative to domestic producers in UK is positive and signi…cant at a 5% level of signi…cance for all numbers of matches and variations of estimation. The smallest estimate is just above 7.79% when the number of matches is one and the maximum is above 8.79% when the number of matches is two. This result strongly supports the argument that domestic …rms that become exporters gain in terms of productivity. In particular, …rms that became exporters gained on average between 7.79 and 8.79 percentage points on their annual productivity a year after the change in their status.
The gains for the …rms that were acquired by multinationals relative to domestic producers in UK were even higher and again signi…cant at 5% level. Firms acquired by multinationals had on average experienced an increase in their productivity growth ranging from 11.55% to 13.09% relative to domestic producers a year after they became subsidiaries of MNEs. This result veri…es empirically the hypothesis that multinational …rms have a superior technology compared to domestic producers in UK and are able to transfer this technological advantage to their subsidiaries. This is observed as a higher TFP growth for the subsidiaries of MNEs when compared with …rms only producing for the domestic market.
In contrast, the ATET for exporters relative to …rms acquired by multinationals is negative but signi…cant at 6% only when one match and heteroscedastic variance are allowed. For the rest of the cases the level of signi…cance is between 7% and 10%. The 6% statistically signi…cant e¤ect has a coe¢ cient of -9.95% indicating that exporters have on average a lower annual TFP growth of almost ten percentage points compared to …rms that have been acquired by multinationals. The rest of the estimates present a similar picture showing a lower productivity for exporters varying from just below 8.6% to almost 9.95%, but are signi…cant at a 10% level.
It is clear from the above discussion and Table 6 that the number of "matches" allowed in the estimation has an impact only on the magnitude and not the sign of the estimates or the level of signi…cance 20 . But even the changes on the magnitude of the estimates are of a quite small size. The maximum di¤erence was 1.54% for the ATET between subsidiaries and domestic producers when one and two "matches" were used. Equally, the bias-correction estimation does not alter signi…cantly the magnitude of the estimates compared to the basic estimation. For most cases, a change in the estimates is observed at the seventh decimal point, while the highest di¤erence occurred at the fourth decimal point. This suggests that there is no problem of non exact matching and that the "quality" of the matching is very high. Moreover, allowing for heteroscedastic variance in the estimation reduces the standard error of the estimates, as expected, but not substantially as it seen from Table 6 . To test the Balancing Property of the Propensity Score I perform a test proposed by Smith and Todd (2005) that suggests running a regression of the following form:
where x i indicates each of the X variables used to estimate the Multinomial Logit. P SC (X) = Pr( =j) Pr( =j)+Pr ( =h) denotes the propensity score that status j occurs relative to status h. D is a dummy variable taking the value of one when = j and the value of zero when = h. The null hypothesis that the coe¢ cients are jointly statistically insigni…cant implies that the balancing property of the propensity score holds. The intuition behind the test is that, if the Balancing Property is satis…ed then the decision to change status D conditional on the propensity score does not a¤ect any of the x i . In other words, the test seeks to check whether there are di¤erences on x i for those that have D = 0 against those that have D = 1. The results of the Balancing Property test are presented in Table 8 . The null hypothesis that the coe¢ cients are jointly statistically insigni…cant at the 5% level is satis…ed in 7 out of 9 cases. Hence, there seems to be evidence that the Balancing Property holds for the great majority of the cases.
Conclusions
This paper has tried to asses the causal e¤ects of a change in the status of …rms in terms of potential total factor productivity gains. There is a vast literature that highlights the possible gains for di¤erent measures of performance, like TFP, labour productivity and size, for …rms that enter foreign markets through exports. They have also highlighted and analysed theoretically and empirically the problems of causality within this analysis, Roberts and Tybout (1997) and Clerides etal (1998) among others. There is also a growing literature on the gains of horizontal FDI or acquisition of …rms by multinationals, Helpman etal (2004) and Head and Ries (2003) . The purpose of this paper is to analyse and empirically estimate the causal e¤ects of a change in the status of …rms from pure domestic producers to either exporters or …rms that have been acquired by multinationals and also the e¤ect of becoming an exporter relative to a subsidiary of a MNE.
There are simultaneity problems that have been highlighted in the literature of evaluation methods that is mainly concern about the e¤ectiveness of labour market programmes, Blundell, Dearden and Sianesi (2005) for example. Motivated by this literature and also by some new research on applied international trade that employed these techniques in the case of a single treatment, Girma etal (2004) and Wagner (2002) , I have tried to analyse the e¤ects described above within the context of multiple treatments methods and this is the most signi…cant novelty of the paper. Multiple treatment matching methods are able to identify the countrerfactual and consequently estimate causal e¤ects.
The matching technique in the case of multiple treatments has been used having as di¤erent treatments three possible statuses for a …rm. These are: i) domestic producer, ii) exporter and iii) subsidiary of a multinational company. Pair-matching on the propensity score with replacement was implemented, allowing for a maximum of four "matches" for each observation in the target group for the estimation of each ATET. The marginal probabilities on being in any of these three possible statuses were estimated by a Multinomial Logit model, where the variables X a¤ecting each of the decisions were lagged employment, lagged physical capital and lagged age of the …rm. Descriptive statistics of the resulting estimates for the marginal probabilities by status are presented in Table 5 , from where it is clear that the probability of being a domestic producer is by far the higher re ‡ecting the big number of pure domestic …rms in our sample.
The estimated ATETs presented in Table 6 are for the sample that it is restricted to satisfy the Common Support condition. It shows that the short-term TFP gains for exporters relative to domestic producers are between 7.79% and 8.79% depending on the number of matches allowed and are all signi…cant at a 5 % level of signi…cance. Identical in sign and again statistically signi…cant at a 5% level, but higher in magnitude are the gains experienced by subsidiaries of multinationals relative to domestic producers, one year after the acquisition. On average …rms that were acquired by MNEs had a higher annual productivity growth between 11.55% to 13.09% relative to domestic producers. Finally, the di¤erence in TFP growth, one year after the change in status, between exporters and …rms that were acquired by MNEs was negative for all the number of matches. But only one was signi…cant at the 6% level with a value of 9.94%. The rest of the estimates were ranging between 8.58% and 9.49% less productivity for exporters, but only signi…cant at the 10% level.
Concluding, it can be said that new exporters experience higher TFP growth, between 7.79% to 8.79% a year after beginning to export, with respect to domestic producers. Productivity gains were also experienced for …rms acquired by multinationals relative to domestic producers ranging from 11.55% to 13.09%, after controlling for the likely problems of simultaneity in our analysis.. In both of these case all the e¤ects estimated were statistically signi…cant at the 5% level. The last case, which assessed the di¤erence in TFP between exporters and …rms that were acquired by MNEs had only one signi…cant estimate at 6% level. This suggests that exporters have a lower annual TFP growth compared to …rms acquired by MNEs by around 9.95 percentage points, but this result is less robust. 
